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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
J. HAROLD MITCHELL,
Res:pondent,
vs.
ARROWHEAD FREIGHT LINES, LTD., )
a corporation, and MARVIN C. VAN
PATTEN,
A ppella;n;ts.

Case No.
7242

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

To avoid any possible confusion, we call the court's
attention to the fact that in quoting the evidence, reference is made to the transcript pages at the bottom of
the page and not the reporter's pages numbered at the
top of the page.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought by the plaintiff, J. Harold
Mitchell, for the purpose of recovering for personal injuries sustained by him arising out of an automobile
accident which occurred April 3, 1947, about 2:15 P.M.
on U. S. Highway 91, south of Beaver, or about fifteen
miles north of Paragonah, Utah, at a place called Muley
Point. ·The highway was a two-lane asphalt road, nineSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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teen and a half feet in width exclusive of the graveled
shoulders two and a half to three feet wide. (Tr. 388)
A dust storm had developed, and the defendant, Marvin
C. Van Patten, a truck driver, was driving a truck and
trailer of the co-defendant, Arrowhead Freight Lines,
Ltd., in a southerly direction following a Buick four-door
sedan, driven by Charles S. Pace of Payson, Utah, attached to which was a small boat trailer. Van Patten
had so followed the Buick through the dust storm for
some two miles on a slight down grade at a very slow
rate of speed, about 10-15 miles per hour {'Tr. 425, 411).
In following the Buick through the dust area, Van Patten
would have to hold the truck back to stay behind (Tr.
441). He came to a long straight of way where it appeared the dust was clearing, and he could s.ee down
the highway a sufficient distance, so that he thought he
had a good opportunity to pass (Tr. 426, 446). Se·eing
no northbound cars app-roaching, he pulled out to the
left to get into position to pass and had barely pulled
up to about the middle· of the boat trailer attached to
the Buick (Tr. 424-5) when he saw plaintiff's 1946 pickup Chevrolet truck driven by plaintiff Mitchell coming
from the opposite direction crossing the highway diagonally from west to east ( Tr. 425-7). The evidence is not
certain as to the distance plaintiff's truck was then away,
but there were varying estjmates of from 100 feet (Tr.
462) to 100 yards (Tr. 427, 458). Pace estimated the distance at from 25 to 50 yards (Tr. 471) ahead of his Buick,
which would probably figure out about 100 to 175 feet
between the front of defendant's truck and the front of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plaintiff's pick-up. Plaintiff denied that he was at any
time on his ,,. .rong' side or that he had com.e from the
"~est side of the high"'"ay (Tr. 237). He claimed to be
stopped or stopping on the east side of the highway (Tr.
237). \'an Patten, upon seeing plaintiff's truck, immediately attempted to stop (Tr. 430) and swung his equipment abruptly to the east, entirely off the improved portion of the highway. Plaintiff also headed his small pickup continuing across the paved portion and across the
east shoulder and out into the barrow pit, where the collision occurred, the vehicles hitting at an angle, so that
the left front of the Mitchell truck hit the right front
corner of defendants' truck ('Tr. 430-2.). See also plaintiff's Exhibit \T. The small Mitchell truck swung around
to face southeast parallel with the larger truck, just
enough to turn the small truck around ('Tr. 440). Se·e
plaintiff's Exhibit T. (Also Tr. 460-1).
The evidence is not entirely clear as to how far east
of the highway the point of impact was, the distance varying from three to four feet east of the paved portion (Tr.
395) to as far as ten or fifteen feet (Tr. 429). One estiInate was fifteen feet east of the center line (Tr. 454-5),
which would be around five or six feet east off the paved
portion.
The following diagram, which is a photostatic copy
of defendants'

Exhib~t

6, illustrates some of the testi-

mony, including the position of the trucks to the east of
the highway where the collision occurred.
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The rectangle, n1arked 'Yith the figure ±, illustrated the
position and direction of the l\1itchell truck 'vhen first
seen by \ ..an Patten and Pace (Tr. 460, 44'6, 447). The
three rectangles together east of the highway shown
fifteen feet from the center line were illustrative of defendants' truck, marked with a figure 1, plaintiff's truek
marked by the figure 2 (to illustrate in what manner
the trucks came together), and the rectangle marked with
the figure 3 is the position of plaintiff's truck wh'jr·e it
came to rest (Tr. 435).
Plaintiff's Exhibit T is a photograph introduced in
evidence by plaintiff, which shows the position of p~lain
tiff's truck with respect to defendants' truck as it came
to rest. The picture is also illustrative of the point of
impact on the small truck, that is, plaintiff's truck on
the left front ('Tr. 436). See also plaintiff's Exhibit V.
The plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, was fifty-one years
of age at the time of the accident. His occupation was
that of a school teacher, having been so engaged at Safford, Arizona for twenty-four years (Tr. 232). Before
the accident, he had arranged to terminate his connections with the Safford Sehool District as of July 1, 1947
(Tr. 332). His salary at the time of the accident as superintendent was $4800.00 a year. There were 1250 pupils
under his supervision from kindergarten to the twelfth
grade (Tr. 233). He owned a ranch and farm in or near
Parowan, Utah~ and had jntentions of getting the ranch
into op.eration and then resuming his occupation as a
school teacher, running the ranch on the side (Tr. 359Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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60). He had no intention of returning to Safford either
before or after the the accident (Tr. 354-5).
Follovring the accident, he was taken to the hospital
Bt Cedar City, where he was under the care of Dr. L. V.
Broadbent for thirteen days. The general nature of plaintiff's injuries as testified to by Dr. Broadbent were a
fr,'l.ctured rib ( Tr. 205), fractures of the lower jaw, one
simple fracture near the point of the chin (Tr. 200) and
compound comminuted fractures on both sides of the
lower jaw ( Tr. 200). Other general injuries consisted of
moderate concussion (Tr. 194, 211), a badly cut left ear
(Tr. 192), swelling about the face (Tr. 209), some hemor-rhage about the ·eye ( Tr. 210), small lacerations requiring one or two or three stitches (Tr. 212) and shock (Tr.
213). There was also loss of several upper teeth, later
necessitating the use of an upper plate .
.A.fter the thirteen days, he left the hospital, spending the next few days in and around Parowan, returning
to Safford, Arizona, April 22, 1947. There he was in
hed for a week or two (Tr. 245, 280) and was treated
u.ntil May 16th by Dr. F. W. Butler, his family physician,
leaving Safford June 3rd, the following month, for Parowan, where he has lived since. In Salt Lake, he "\Vas att.ended by Dr. K. L·. Dedekind, oral surgeon, and Dr.
W. Les· W arhurton, who took care of his teeth inserting
an upp·er plate. He received no other medical treatment
except a few visits to the office of Dr. Paul ·s. Richards
in Bingham, Utah, between June 18, 1947, and July 2,
1947 (Tr. 512). He was also examined by Dr. Reed Clegg
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on January 15, 1948, and April_20, 1948, just preceding
the trial. The testimony of these physicians, and the
nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries will hereafter he
discussed in greater detail. Suffice it to say here that
the principal complaint at the time of the trial was some
(or as was described by Dr. Clegg "n1oderate") limitation of motion ·of the j~aws and neck; other,vise the evidence showed that he had overcome, or was overcoming,
his injuries, but plaintiff testified as to his tnen present
inability to do the hard physical work on his farm.
Annuity tables, combined with the American Ex..
perience of Mortality or Life Expectancy tables, were
offered and received in evidence over defendants' objec..
tions. The jury returned a verdict in favor o.f plaintiff
and against both defendants on the first cause of action
0f $18,691.72 general.damage, plus $1,638.50 special dam .
age, on the second cause of action $1,2:64.00 making a
total verdict of $21,594.22.
Both defendants have appealed from the judgment.
ASSIGNMENTS O·F ERROR
Errors in Relation to the Annuity Tables

The court erred :
1. In admitting 1n evidence the· annuity tables
(Plaintiff's Exhibit X) over defendants' repeated ob. ·
jections to said tables and the entire line of such evi..
dence, based upon the grounds that they were incom..
petent, irrelevant and immaterial, insufficient founda..
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion laid, and specific ohjectjon the form of such ~evidence
as offered by said exhibit, and that the entire line of
such evidence and some of the questions and answ·ers in
relation thereto assumed facts which were not in evidence. (Tr. 405, 418, 410, 411~ 412, 541).
2. In denying
tables. (Tr. 541.)

defendant~'

motion to strike said

In giving instruction No. 22 ( Tr. 79), excepted to
( Tr. 546), which effectively told the jury to use such
tables and in connection therewith, failing in any way
to qualify the mortality table used in connection with
said Exhibit X.
3.

In instructing the jury by its instruction No. 17
that plaintiff was ''entitled to contpensation for his
actual loss of p1ast ·Barnrings, if any, and for the impairment of earning capacity * * * in the future," (Tr. 75),
excepted to (Tr. 545).
4.

In refusing to give defendants' requested instruction No.15 (Tr . 100) withdrawing the annuity tables
from the jurors' consideration; excepted to ( Tr. 547).
5.

The court erred in overruling (Tr. 31), Para~
graph 2 (i) of defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's
amended complaint (Tr. 27) relating to special damages
in the nature of wages paid on the ranch.
6.

Errors as to other Instructions

The court erred :
In giving its instruction No. 6 (Tr. 63) excepted
to (Tr. 544).
7.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8. In giving its instruction No. 7 (Tr. 64) excepted
to ( Tr. 5±4-5).
9. In giving its instruction No. 8 (Tr. 65) excepted
to ( Tr. 545) .
10. In giving its instruction No. 10 ( Tr. 67)

~excepted

to (Tr. 545).

11. In refusing to g1ve the latter part of defendants' requested instruction No. '6 (Tr. 90) excepted to
(Tr. 546).

12. In refusing to give defendants' requested mstruction No. 9 (Tr. 94) exeepted to (Tr. 547).
13. In refusing to give defendants' requested lnstruction No. 18 (Tr. 103) excepted to (Tr. 547).
defendant~'

14. The com·t erred in denying
for a new trial (Tr. 118-119; 152).

m.otion

)

We have briefly stated the assignments of error
particularly relating to the instructions of the court for
the reason that the instructions complained of are hereinafter set forth in greater detail. We have grouped the
assignn1ents so that those relating to the annuity tables
can be considered together, and those relating to the
court's instructions on negligence and contributory negligence can be considered in a

sep~arate

group.
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 TO 6
Error in Admitting Annuity Tables
The trial judge r~efused to permit us to argue the
question of admissibility or propriety of the annuity
tables (Plaintiff's Exhibit X) as to form, eind overruled
our repeated objections to their introduct~on in evidence
based upon the several grounds hereina-bove stated. It
was acknowledged these objectionf; s.hould go to the
entire line of testimony (Tr. 411, 412, 416), and all of
defendants' objections were renewed in the form of a
motion to strike the annuity tables, Plaintiff's Exhibit
X (Tr. 541).
This court in Rauley v. McCarthy,
(Utah) 184
Pac. ( 2) 123, apparently realizing the misuse of these
tables in many cases and the vicious ·eff,ect they usually
have upon the jurors, placed a definite reBtriction upon
the use of such tables, as follows :
·''We wish to make it clear that we do not
hold that in every case where permanent injuries
are alleged and evidence in suppoTt thereof is
introduced, that the mortality and annuity tables
are admissible. We go only so far as to hold that
where the injury alleged and proved is permanent and is of such nature as to indicate a permanent materia:l impairment of a substantial nature
in the earning capacity of the plaintiff, the mortality and annuity tables are admissible.''
Therefore, in the instant case, we have pr~esented
the question as to whether there was evidence to support
a finding not only that plaintiff's injuries were perma.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nen.t, but such as to prove "a perrnwnent imp,airment of
a

S1J,bstart~ttial

nature in the earning

cap~acity

of the plain-

tiff." Other objections to the particular tables used in
this

cast~

are raised in this appeal.

THE PLE-6-t\..DINGS
In tae instant case, while plaintiff by his pleadings

claimed that his injuries would render him unable to
carry on his duties as a school teacher {S-ee paragraph
5 of plaintiff's amended complaint, Tr. 21), he did not
claim that his earning capacity was perma;rn.ently impaired in connection with the op~era.tion· of the ranch,
but in substance alleged by paragraph 11 of the amended
complaint, that it wa.s necessary to ·employ other parties
to perform some of the work, and by reason thereof
suff.ered loss of earnings to the then amount of approximately $3,000 ( Tr. 23) .
It is also significant that plaintiff, by his pleadings,
based his claimed neck injury upon the existence of fractures in the vertebrae, as follows :
''·That by reason of the fracture and injury
to his cervical vertebra, plaintiff suffers from
stiffness in the neck and pain upon motion * * *
that the injuries to his neck and nervous system
may he permanent in character."
As we · shall see from the eviden0e, any possible
fracture of the neck or cervical vertebra, as testified to
by Dr. Butler (which was the reason plaintiff probably
believed he had a broken neck) was entirely disproved
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by plaintiff's own witnesses, Drs. Broadbent and Clegg.
If not, it was clear tha.t any possible fracture or even
chip fracture (which Dr. Clegg indicated could have
been a possibility) had entirely hBaled, and there would
be no disability due to fractures. Plaintiff himself acknowledged he did not require any particular treatment
as to his claimed neck injuries ( Tr. 346-7).
THE EVID·ENCE
The only lay testimony as to plaintiff's inabHity, if
any, to teach school was plaintiff's answer to his counsel's question:

'' Q. Would you he ab[e, from a physical stand~
point, to carry on your vocation as a school
teacher or s-chool sup,erintendent at the present time~

* * *
A. I wouldn't want to try to continue my school
work at the ~p~r"<e:sent time.

Q.

Why~

A.

I just simply feel like I couldn't handle it
this year." ( Tr. 332)

He was paid for the full school year, ending July 1,
1947 (Tr. 354-5). He was taking part in activities in the
community, and had been teaching a Sunday School class
for about two months and singing in a choral group for
about five weeks (Tr. 353).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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L\..s to the ranch nnd his activities in connection there\Yith, h~e testified:
"I had intended to come to Parowan where
n1y farm property 'vas, farm and ranch property,
and to, first of all, get that in condition so that
it "\vould operate properly, and then, if conditions arose whereby I could continue my school
work, I had always expected to do that.'' (Tr. 35960)
''I have a farm and some livestock range,
the farm itself consists of what they call thirty
and a quarter acres of water; that acre, however,
calls for about 1.8 hours of water from the po:r
tion of the stream that comes down the Parowan
Canyon. * * * You can irrigate on that, most any
season, two to two and a half times that much
land. * * * I have about 98 acres at the p-resent
time that I'll attempt to irrigate this summer.
* * * As to grazing lands, I have pastures there
in the valley, and winter grazing set-up over in
the north ·end of the valley, privately owned, and
some public domain, then I have approximately
fourteen hundred acres of summer grazing mountain land, eight to ten miles south of Parowan.''
(Tr. 333)
He further testified that in connection with this ground,
he ran sheep and cattle. During the past year, he paid
his brother wages, $150 a month, to operate the ranch
and farm, ('Tr. 333) from June until the 2nd day of
Deeember, 1947 (Tr. 334). He (plaintiff) was personally able to do very little ranching or farming work up
until December of 1947. Since that time, December,
1947, there has been very little to handle, just a few
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chor·es to do during the winter time. Now spring is
opening up, there is real work down there. ''At the
present time, my father has been helping a little, and
my son has been helping.'' ( Tr. 334)
He testifi,ed to being able to do the chores and substantially all of the work around the farm and take care
of the farm, except the heavy work like hoisting grain
and things of that kind. He was able to manage the farm
(Tr. 353).
H·e could drive an automobile in pretty good shape,
although he had some difficulty in turning to look to
the rear ; that at the time of trial, he was engaged in
farming; that he was then unable to do ''strenuous physical work, I cZon't ·do that well." He could drive the tractor, although he wouldn't undertake to drill grain (Tr.
248). ''I can ride horses, trusty horses, all right, if I
take it easy. * * * I don't usually get them off the walk.''
That he has some pain and discomfort when he attempts
to lift heavy objects (Tr. 249). That. he was unable to
pitch hay without some pain· (Tr. 250).
He said his ribs had entirely cleared up; that he had
no dizziness; that his headaches have dimi~ished quite
considerably, although they were still with him; that his
breathing was "quite definitely cleared up." (Tr. 344)
That he didn't require any particular treatment as to his
claimed neck injuries ( Tr. 346-7) .
Plaintiff was the only lay witness to testify regarding his condition.
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~IEDICAL

TESTIMONY

DR. L. V. BRO·ADBENT
Dr. L. 'l. Broadbent, the attending physician at
Cedar City took x-rays of the skull and javvs, Exhibits
E and G, (Tr.197-8), an x-ray, Exhibit F, of the jaw after
the jaw was wired (Tr. 202), and x-rays of the should~rs
· and ribs, Exhibits I and J (Tr. 204-5). The x-rays showed a fractured rib and fractures of the lower jaw as
heretofore described. Treatment for the most p·art consisted of reducing the fractured jaw and wiring the
jaws into position and suturing the left ear. He further
testified that after wiring the· jaws, there was ·good
alignment and good apposition with respect to those
fractures (Tr. 205).
With respect to the x-rays of the cervical.spine, he
said: "I was unable to demonstrate to my satisfaction
that there was a fracture to· the back bone or cervical
vertebra. * * * I didn't find any. The positions of alignment were good. * * * I was looking particularly for a
fracture in that area, but I couldn't demonstrate one.
(Tr. 217) Damage to tissue· causes pa1n; they repair
themselves.'' ( Tr. 218)
As to the ear, he stated that the blood supply would
regenerate and that the ear was then well attached (Tr.
220-21), a slight scar remaining behind the ear. (Tr. 194)
There was no skull fracture. (Tr. 223) He left the hospital April 16th after thirteen days, and never returned for
further treatment. (Tr. 209) No opinion was expressed
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by Dr. Broadbent regarding the permanency of plaintiff's
. . .
InJuries.
DR. F. W. BUTL·ER
'The testimony of Dr. F. W. Butler, plaintiff's personal physician, was taken by deposition at Safford, Arizona, March ·6, 1948, and read at the trial. He testified
to having treated plaintiff April 22nd to May 16th, his
last visit. (Tr. 281) His general description of the injuries is much the same as that of Dr. Broadbent. (Tr.
261-2) He said that plaintiff was at home up to May 4th,
but that he was able to. come to the office for the next
appointment May 9th. (Tr. 280) He took x-rays, plaintiff's Exhibits B and C, May 9, 1947. Exhibit B was an
incomplete exposure. Exhibit C related to the cervical
vertebra. Exhibit A of the frontal sinuses was taken
May 16th. (Tr. 261)
Dr. Butler's testimony differed from that of the
other doctors in that he gave as his opinion that Exhibit
C showed ''a fracture in the body of the first cervical
vertebra'' and ''a comminuted chip about one-fifth the
size of the body of the first cervical vertebra." (Tr. 269,
282) He then gave as his opinion, based upon the existence of the fractured vertebra, that the i~jury to the neck
would be of a permanent nature, and that there would
''be some limitation of motion there * * * limitation of
motion in all spheres, side, lateral, up, down, back-all
spheres of motion.'' (Tr. 271) He had op·erated on plaintiff for an appendectomy about two weeks prior to the
accident. (Tr. 277) And had previously treated plaintiff
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for gall bladder trouble the preceding },I arch. ( Tr. 278-9,
286) That the last treatment 'vas rendered by him May
16, 19±7. (Tr. 281) That plaintiff finished all his regular routine 'vork before leaving Safford June 3rd. (Tr.
283) That he made a \vonderful recovery-he would not
say a complete recovery, but he made a remarkable comeback. (Tr. 284) That with reference to the vertebra, he
did not ever have him wear a Forester collar. (Tr. 284)
In fact, if there was a fracture, the condition had healed
to the extent that he did not think a collar was necessary, and if it had healed that much in that three weeks
period, it would continue to heal. That he believed plaintiff would continue to get better right along, except that
he was not qualified to exp.ress an opinion as an expert
on nerve injuries. (Tr. 285)
On re-direct examination, Dr. Butler summed up
his opinion as follows: '~Well, I had still in my mind
that the last time I saw him he had this limitation of
motion in his neck and he had pain in his jaw and quite
a lot of nervousness.'' ( Tr. 287)
DR. K. L. DEDEKIND
~fr.

Mitchell came to Dr. K. L. Dedekind July 2,
1947, for dental surgery and an x-ray was taken. (See
plaintiff's Exhibit D.) Dr. Dedekind stated there were
no teeth damaged in the lower jaw (Tr. 172), and two
of the rear lower teeth were infected by pyorrhea not
caused by the accident ( Tr. 172, 181-2). There were
nine of the up·per teeth with respect to which there was
no evidence of injury (Tr. 172). 'The remaining upper
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teeth, however, were not adequate to support a denture
very well (Tr. 173). It was decided to remove all of the
upper teeth and insert a complete upper plate (Tr. 173).
'That during the healing processes, he would be inconvenienced by not being able to eat as formerly (Tr. 176).
That ordinarily fractures of that type repair themselves
(Tr. 182), and on July 2nd, when he examined Mr.
Mitchell, he found them repaired at that time, and that
they were ''solid and well u~i ted.'' ( Tr. 183) When the
x-rays were taken July 2nd, he noticed some restriction
in the ability of Mr. Mitchell to open his mouth (Tr. 186187), and further stated: ''There may be fractures where
a good union would be achieved and the jaw would become solid again, and yet there would he a restriction
upon the motion of the jaw * * * depending upon the
position and ·extent of t:Q.e fracture." (Tr. 188)
DR. W. LES WARBURTO·N
Dr. Warburton's testimony was not materially different from that of Dr. Dedekind. He testified to semiankylosis of the jaw at the time of his first examination
July 22, 1947. With reference to that time, he further
testified that his mouth was pretty well healed-"in the
healing process, almost complete." (Tr. 370) A complete upper denture was installed October 14th. (Tr.
376)

DR. REED CLEGG
The testimony of Dr. Reed Clegg, orthopedist who
\Vas used by plaintiff for the purpose of physical examSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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inations January 15, 1948, and Ap-ril 20, 1948, just before the trial, for the purpose of determining plaintiff's
then physical condition summarizes the extent of plaintiff's injuries on those dates. He took numerous x-rays
and stated that his findings disclosed the following:
(1) A healed fracture of the left mandible ; (2) Absence
partial teeth; (3) Healed scar of the left ear; ( 4) Area of
anesthesia about the left ear and left side of the chin;
( 5) Healed rib fracture, seventh on the left side ; ( 6)
Anklyosis or limitation of motion, partial fibrous of the
cervical spine or nee~; (7) Apparent healed fracture of
the nasal bone, with deviation of nasal symptom to the
left; (8) Anklyosis, partial fibrous slight of left thumb
in the opponens direction; and (9) Anklyosis p:artia1
fibrous temporal mandibular. (Tr. 290-291) As to the
x-rays he took, Dr. Clegg "testified that plaintiff's Exhibit Q, x-ray of the chest, indicated there may have
been a fracture of the seventh rib. (Tr. 292-3) Exhibit
P, a side view of the cervical spine, part of the 1eft jaw
and skull, showed no abnormalities but a roughened area
on the jaw may possibly have been a fracture. (Tr. 2934) Exhibit 0, jaw bone, showed a roughened area indicating a healed fracture. ('Tr. 294) Exhibit N, left hand,
definitely no abnormalities. ( Tr. 294-5) Exhibit M, front
and back view of neck, showed no abnormalities. (Tr.
295-6)
Dr. Clegg was then shown plaintiff's Exhibit C,
which was the x-ray taken by Dr. Butler at Safford, Arizona. The only possible evidence of fracture he could
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detect from that exposure was what he described as ''an
area of roughness in front or anterior to the first cervical vertebra," (Tr. 296) which "might be the result of a
chip fracture.'' (Tr. 297)
Dr. Clegg then gave as his opinion with respect to
the .jaw that there would be ''some permanent limitation
of the motion," (Tr. 298) and as to the neck, "I would
expect there would be some limitation of motion.'' (Tr.
299)
'

That in the opinion of Dr. Clegg was the full extent of any possible permanent injuries other than a
small area of anesthesia in the vicinity of the lower rib.
(Tr. 301)
Upon being asked whether the condition of the body
and neck would have a tendency to p·roduce pain, he said,
"It might." (Tr. 302)
On cross ·examination Dr. Clegg further testified:

'' Q. Would you explain to the jury what 'ankylosis' means, Doctor~
A.

The term, 'ankylosis,' merely means limitation of motion, may he partial or complete.

Q.

It is used in lieu of the term 'stiffness', is

it not~
A. Yes, similar. ·( Tr. 303-4)
Q. Now, with respect to the x-rays you have
examined, I believe you indicated that the
only possible fracture you could observe as
to the cervical vertebra was a chip, fracture~
A. Yes, sir.
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Q.

So, fron1 your examination of those x-rays,
you ,,~ould conclude there was no fracture
in the vertebra itself-that is, in the body
of the Yertebra or into the joint~

. .~.

I couldn't see any, no, sir.

* * * *
A.

There is some bony roughness which may
represent a healed chip fracture.

Q.

A healed chip

A.

That's right.

Q.

Will a healed chip fracture ordinarily result
in any stiffness or limitation of motion~

A.

Not necessarily from the bony changes, no,
sir.

Q.

Ordinarily you wouldn't expect any limitation
of motion by reason of that~ (Tr. 305-6)

A.

Not from the bony changes.

Q.

So that, so far as the hones are concerned,
there is no fractures you have been able to
locate which should, in any way, restrict the
movement of Mr. Mitchell's neck~

A.

That is, as far as the hones are concerned,
yes, sir.

fracture~

With respect to the tissues of the neck, Dr. Clegg
testified:
Q.

And tissues and fibrous tissue in the neck,
Doctor, tends to repair itself, does it not~

A.

There is general improvement, but there may
be permanent limitation.
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Q.

There may

he~

A. Yes, sir.
Q.

Whether there is going to be permanent
limitation in a particular case is a rna tter of
speculation, is it not, Doctor~

A. Yes, sir ; yes, sir.
Q.

Just pure

guesswork~

A. Well, we don't term it that. (Tr. 309)

Q. But it is
A.

speculation~

It is speculation.

Q. As to how he is going to be in the future?
A.

Based on experience.

Q.

But the normal thing is for that tissue to repair itself and the patient to imp~rove~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

That tissue to build itself up again and become strong~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And, during your practice, Doctor, have you
treated many patients with neck injury involving damage to the fibrous tissue~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And most of them fina'lly regain the full use
of their neck, do they not, or substantially
so? '('Tr. 310)
A. Depending on the extensiveness of the injury, they do.
Q. People you have so treated have been people
doing comparatively hard labor'
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All types.

Q.

Their neck becomes strong, and they return
to their occupations and go through life,
sometimes just about as good as they did,
or as well as before, do they not~

A. I would say by far the majority do.
Q. Yes. And if, assuming, Doctor, that Mr. Mitchell, on or about the 15th day of January
of this year, which was, I believe, the very
day you examined him, stated at that time
that his neck was getting better, improving,
you would normally expect that that neck
would continue to do so, would you not~

A. I think so.
Q.

And it would gradually improve· and become
better~
·

A. I think so.
(~.

And might become entirely well, so far as
that neck injury is concerned~

A.

Might.·

Q.

Now, the same would be true as to these
fractures of the jaw, would it not, that the
soft tissue of the jaw which is damaged, bones
which were damaged, they would normally
tend to restore themselves, would they not~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And whether or not there be any - you
couldn't state for any certainty as to whether
or not - well, I belive you stated, Doctor,
there might be some permanent loss of motion
there, that there might be~
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A.

If I said, 'might', I should have said stronger;
I don't think there is much question about it,
there will be some limitation; you can't say
a hundred per cent sure, but I don't think
there is much question about it.

Q.

And the extent of that disability would be a
matter of pure speculation, however, wouldn't
1. t OJ.

A.

Yes, there is always variations.'' (Tr. 31112)
DR. PAUL S. RICHAR·D·S

Plaintiff came to Dr. Richards June 18th, about
two and a half months after the accident, and made some
repeat visits until July 2nd following. (Tr. 512) In open
court, he ·examined all of the x-rays of the neck, Exhibit
A taken by Dr. Butler, Exhibit C by Dr. Butler, Exhibit
F by Dr. Broadben t, Exhibit P by Dr. Clegg, five x-rays
1

of the cervical spine, defendants' Exhibits 1 to 5
inclusive, all of which he testified were entirely negative
as to any fracture. (Tr. 513-519) Based upon the history
of the case and an examination of a;ll of these x-rays,
he concluded there was no fracture of the cervical vertebra. (Tr. 519) 'He also stated as his opinion that so far
as the bony structure was concerned, ''the ultimate outcome should he no permanent or partial disability.''
('Tr. 521) As to what progress the damage, if any, to
the. soft tissues had made in the meantime, he reserved
his opinion due to the fact that he had not seen Mr.
Mitchell since July 2, 1947, (Tr. 521) but went on to say:
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''I can tell the court this that in my opinion,
at the time of my examination, I felt definitHly
that this man would improve and provided he
\vas under adequate supervision, provided the
man was diligent in his own endeavor to improve,
then I \vould expect he had marked improvement
over \vhat I found at the time of my examination
in July of 1947.

'' Q. And what would you say, Doctor, as to what
he should do by way of diligence or activity
in order to improve that condition~
A.

Well, I felt he should immediately go out
and engage in a definite therap·utie policy of
keeping himself entirely occupied and physically active.

Q. And does that activity tend to repair that
condition in the neck, or make it well~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Improve that
A.

J es, sir."

condition~

(Tr. 522)

Then on re-direct examination
White's questions, he stated:
''A.

1n

ans"'\ver to Mr.

!1y opinion, following the injury this is to
early to try to ascertain permanent disability.
This man can suffer ev·erything you state and
still he only in a partial temporary disabled
condition. (Tr. 524)

Q. How much time should elapse from the time
of the accident before you could determine
whether he had a permanent restriction of
motion in the neck~
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A. If the condition was fixed at a certain point~
Q. Yes. (Tr. 525)
A. I would say at least two years.
Q. Then after two years you think you could
make a pretty safe judgment as to whether he
would be permanently injured, or not~
A. Provided the patient had been under proper
guidance.' ' ( Tr. 526)

DR.A.K. WILSON
Dr. A. K. Wilson, an experienced radiologist, went
over each and every x-ray in the case relating to the cervical vertebra and gave as his opinion that there was
nothing that he would consider a fracture of the cervical vertebra (Tr. 489) and nothing as to the bone condition of the neck which could restrict motion. ( Tr. 490)
That the vertebrae were all in good alignment and apposition. ( Tr. 481-4'95)

LACK O·F EVIDENCE
From the foregoing, it is seen that the doctors
could only speculate whether there was a permanent
injury to the neck and jaw of plaintiff. ·The most that
can be said is that there might be some limitation of
motion, which Dr. Clegg described at the time of his
examination as moder-ate, but proof of permanent injury
is not proof of ''a permanent material impairment of a
substa;ntial nature in the earning oap~ac~t'vy of the plaintiff."
1. None of the doctors testified that plaintiff would
be unable to p·erform the duties of a school t·each·er, or
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that he would be unable to carry on the operations of his
ranch.
2. There was no evidence that plaintiff would be
permjWYbemtly unable to carry on his activities in the teaching profession.
3. There "\vas no evidence that plaintiff would have
taught school for his full life expectancy, and furthermore, the State la'v allows retirement at ages fifty-five
and sixty after fifteen years of service. (Sec. 75-29-44,
Utah Code Annotated 1943).
4. While plaintiff testified that he was at the time
of trial unable to do the strenuous physical work, his
testimony was uncorroborated by any medical testimony,
and there was rn;o testimony that he would· be unable to
do hard physical work permanently.
5. If plaintiff was physically able to engage in
strenuous physical work before the accident at the age
of fifty-one years after tw·enty-four years of teaching
school (and there was no actual evidence on that matter),
there was no evidence that he w;ould have been physically
able to .engage in that type of work ·dwring ·his full life
expectancy 10{ 20.20 years.
6. No evidence that plaintiff would not have hired
some hands for the hard physical work on the farm, notwithstanding the accident.
7. No evidence that the operation of the ranch or
farm was an asset or a liability or that there was any
earning capacity in connection with the operation of the
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ranch, especially as to a school teacher without practical
farming experience.
8. It was not even proven by any evidence that
plaintiff's income, if any from the ranch, would be less
even though he hired some help, because by spending
more time to good management, his capacity to earn
may ha:ve been gre·ater.
9. 'There was no evidence that plaintiff's earning
capacity would be less while teaching school and managing the ranch, as was his intention, than it would be
if he did all the strenuous physical work.
It was error to permit the jury to consider the annuity tables in connection with plaintiff's teaching profession, first because of the ·entire lack of any ·evidence that
he would permanently he unable to teach (the only statement on the matter being plaintiff's statement that he
did not feel up to it that year); second, even had there
been any evidence, it was error to permit the jury to
consider the matter from the standpoint of plaintiff's
full life expectancy from the dat·e of the accident, (20.20
years)' when he was actuailly paid in full to July 1, 1947,
and contemplated discontinuing his school work when he
got the ranch and farm going. He would then be fiftytwo on September 15, 1947; nor could it he assumed that
he would teach the balance of his life exp·ectancy up to
the .time of his death, nor beyond the retirement age of
fifty-five to sixty years.
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As to the ranch, the total insufficiency of the evidence to establish that plaintiff sustained any permanent
loss of ·earning capacity of a substantial nature in connection therewith is apparent in that in order to so find,
first, it is necessary to assume or infer from the evidence
that plaintiff had an earning capacity in connection
therewith (the opposite might be the conclusive pre sump~
tion in the case of a school teacher, fifty-one years of
age, without farming experience) ; second, if it be assumed that he had an ·earning capacity, then as to the
strenuous physical work, it would have to be inferred or
assumed from the evidence that he would peTmanently
be unable to perform the same; inferred that he was
able 'to do the hard physical work before the accident;
inferred that if he could so do, he would have continued
to be physically able to do the strenuous manual work
during his full life expectancy; further inferred that he
would not, during the full term of his life expectancy,
have hired the hard manual work done anyway. :Then,
if each of those inferences were resolved in favor ·of
plaintiff, it would have to be inferred from those inferences that the earning capacity as to the ranch would
be greater by doing the strenuous physical work himself
rather than hiring it done. That, too, would be insufficient under the facts in the instant case because plaintiff intended to occupy himself as a school teacher and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

manage the ranch. It would, therefore, further have to
be inferred that plaintiff's earning capacity would be less
while teaching school and managing the ranch, (which
would consume his full time) than it would be by himself
doing the strenuous physical work; and so to reach the
ultimate fact, it is necessary to construct inference upon
inference.
F AIL·URE TO· SUSTAIN BURDEN ·OF PRO·OF
The burden of proving by competent and actual
evidence that plaintiff sustained "a permanent material
impairment of a substantial nature in his earning capacity"

rest~ed

upon plaintiff. That burden is not fulfilled

where it is necessary to pryramid inferences or base inference upon inf·erence to reach the ultimate conclusion.
Utah Fownrky & Maehime C'o. v.

Uta~

Gas & Coke C,o,.,

42 Utah 533, 131 Pac. 1173; Karr-ern v. Biair, 63 Utah 344,
P~acking

& StO'naf}le Co. v. United
Pacific Insurance Co., (Wash.) 106 Pac. (2) 314; Goodloe
v. ~o-Mar D'airies Co., ·(Kan.) 185 Pac. (2) 158.
225 Pac. 1094; Prentice

In McC,affrey v.

Schw~artz,

(Pa.) 132 Atl. 810, the

Pennsylvani~

Supreme Court refused to p·ermit use of
annuity tables where there were too many uncertainties
involved. The court pointed out that, among other things,
the jury's attention should he called to the fact that a
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man's earning power naturally decreases as his life approaches its end, and that is particularly true "of the
manual laborer, but it also applies in a less degree to
the av-erage brain worker.'' That statement is particularly applicable to the instant case in that it would be
highly improbable that Mitchell would be capable of
doing the strenuous physical work clear through to the
end of his life expectancy or his natural death.

OBJECTIONS AS TO FO·RM
The following is a copy of the .table, or plaintiff's
Exhibit X, as offered and received in evidence:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT X
CASE NO. 81886

J.

HAR~OLD

MITCHELL VS. ARROWHEAD FREIGHT LINES LIMITED
AND MARVIN C. VAN PATTEN

Computations of P:fiesent Value of Various Monthly Income
At Various Rates, Age 51, Life Exp,ectancy 20.20 Years
Based on Am·erican Exper[ence Mortality Table
(242 Months or Periods Used in Computations)
RATES

PER ANNUM

3%
ANNUITY
PER MONTH

$

1.00
10.00
25.00
50.00
100.00
200.00
300.00

4%

5%

6%

PRESENT VALUES OF MONTHLY ANNUITIES AT ABOVE RATES

----------$ 189.92 $ 185.60 $ 181.41 $ 173.42
---------- 1,899.24
1,855.96
1,814.05 1,734.16
---------- 4,748.09
4,639.90
4,535.13 4,335.39
---------- 9,496.19
9,279.80
9,070.26 8,670.78
---------- 18,992.37 18,559.59 18,140.53 17,341.56
---------- 37,984.75 37,119.18 3·6,281.05 34,683.12
---------- 56,977.12 55,678.76 54,421.58 52,024.69

$

165.92 $ 152.26 $ 140.18
1,6.59.17
1,522.58
1,401.80
4,147.93
3,806.45
3,504.51
8,295.86
7,612.90
7,009.02
16,591.72. 15,225.80 14,018.05
33,183.45 30,451.60 28,036.09
49,775.17 45,677.41 42,054.14
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...-lttention is called to the fact that the table, being
based upon 20.20 years of life expectancy, was in such
form that the jurors \Yere bound to assume that plaintiff
would live his full life expectancy, it being impractical or
impossible for them to make any other use of the table,
and the court gave no qualifying instructions to i:he jury
as to the use, if any, the jurors could or should make
\Yith reference to the life expectancy.
The court in P.auza v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 231
Penn. 577, 80 Atl. 1126, held that when mortality tables
are entered in a personal injury action, it is the duty of
the judge to carefully guard the eff·ect to. be given them
by the jury, and that:
''Unless this is done in a very pointed and
direct way by the court, the jury may be misled
as to the value and w·eight to be attached to this
character of evidence. The important fact for the
jury to determine is the life expectancy of
the injured party. This depends more upon his
prior state of health, character, and habits, perils
of employment, personal characteristics and other
circumstances surrounding his own life, than :it
does upon the average expectancy of other lives
based upon mortality tables. The trial judge
should instruct the jury that these tables are not
to be accepted as establishing the expectancy of
life of the injured party, but only as an aid in
arriving at what the expectancy might be in
view of all the conditions surrounding the particular life in question. It is not sufficient to instruct
the jury that the tables are some aid, but not conclusive in determining the life expectancy of the
injured party. All the circumstances affecting
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the probable duration of life disclosed by the
evidence should be called to the attention of the
jury in order that they may have an intelligent
understanding of what their duty is in determining the life expectancy in the particular case submitted to them. ''
Similarly holding that the court should not leave the
jury to infer from instructions that mortality tables are
to serve as an absolute standard, but must give adequate
qualifying instructions, see :

McCaffrey v. Schwiartz, ('Pa.) 132 Atl. 810;
Bowman v. Coyle. (Kan.) 2'60 Pac. 643 ;.
Vicksburg & Merid~am R. Co., Pl. in error v. Israel
P~utman, 118 U. S. 545, 30 L. Ed. 257;
Morrow v. M,erndleson, (Cal.) 58 Pac. ( 2) 1302;
Scott v. Sheedy, 102 Pac. (2) 575;
Cornell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (Mont.) 187
Pac. 902.
The court, by its instruction No. 22 (Tr. 79), in effect
instructed the jury to unqualifiedly make use of the table
(Plaintiff's Exhibit X) in awarding damages as follows:
''If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff on the question of liability and if you likewise find from preponderance of the evidence that
p1laintiff has suffered an impairment of earning
capacity and as a result thereof will suffer a loss
of future earnings as a proximate result of his
injuries, the damages resulting from a loss of
such earnings would not be the total of the
amounts he would thus lose in the future, but
would be the present cash value of such t~otal.
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''The total loss of future earnings, if any,
mu.st be reduced or discounted on the basis of a
fair rate of interest or return on said sum. It is
for you to determine from the evidence what rate
of intenest or return could ~airly be expect-ed from
a safe investment which a person of ordinary prudence, but 'vithout any particular financial experience or skill, could make, ·and reduce or disaoun.t the total swm at such fair 11ate of interest
0 r return ·as you thus me·termine. ''
From the parts underscored, the jury would naturally assume that they were to use the table. While some
qualification with respect to the use of the annuity table
was given in the following instructions, No. 2·2-A (Tr. 80),
the jury was misled and no qu·alification of any shape
or form was given to the life expectarncy tables.
The table in the form offered assumed facts which
wer.e not proved by the evidence. ( Tr. 541). There was
certainly no evidence of loss of $300 per month, or $200
a month, or any other sum, and the court should have
granted defendants' motion to strike the specified figures, and at least limited the table to such figures as
there was evidence to sustain them. Plaintiff might just
as well compile a table up to $500 or $1,000 a month, and
figure that if the jury knocked down the amount twothirds, that he would obtain a verdict based on $300 a
month, or approximately $50,000.
We heretofore called attention to the pleadings and
pointed out the insufficiency of plaintiff's allegations
as to any loss of earning cap·acity in connection with the
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ranch. By the allegations of the amended complaint, we
were lead to believe that plaintiff was claiming speciai
damages by reason of wag·es paid in the amount of $3,000.
We therefore demurred specially by paragraph 2 (i)
(Tr. 27) of said demurerr, asking that plaintiff be more
specific as to such claim. Had the court sustained the
sp~ecial demurrer, as it should have done, plaintiff would
have thereby been required to be specific about what
his actual claims were as to the ranch and the wages paid,
or whether he was in fact claiming anything by way of
''p,ermanrent imp,airment ~of e1arning oap1a city'' in connection with the. ranch, a question which is not yet clear
in this case, either from the pleadings or the evidence
introduced. For that reason, we have claimed error in
connection with the ruling on our special demurrer.
Another development is important in this connection.
The only evidence of wages paid was $.150 a month to
plaintiff's brother from June to December 2, 1947, or
approximately $900. At the conclusion of the evidence,
when counsel saw the court was going to leave the annuity tables in evidence, he very shrewdly told the court
that he withdrew his claim of wages paid the brother.
While his action in so doing does not specifically appear
of record, he will not deny the matter, as it is evident
from the instructions given by the court on special damages that the $900 item was eliminated because the it~m
of specia:l damages r·elating to the second cause of action,
$1,2;64, ('Tr. 116) was damage to plaintiff's truck, and the .
item of special damage in the verdict of th.e first cause of
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action, $1,638.50, (Tr. 116) (see also the court's instruction No. 18) (Tr. 76) consisted solely of hospital, medical and traveling expenses and incidental damage to
personal property. While no complaint would normally he
made as to counsel's withdrawing the item of $900 in
\Yages, it is evident that his purpose in so doing was to
confuse the jury as to the difference between claimed
special damages for wages paid plaintiff's brother on the
ranch with permanent loss of earnilng capacity. That
this probably did so confuse the jury is evident from the
verdict based on $16,591.72 (an exact figure from the
table) or $100 per month for plaintiff's life exp:ectancy,
and the approximate amount plaintiff was paying his
brother during the first year, that is about $900 for about
nine months.
When the total verdict was $21,594.22, it takes no
stretch of the imagination hy reference to the table, to
see that the jury arbitrarily selected the figure $16,591.72
from the four per cent column in the fifth line providing
for $100 per month for the full life expectancy. As four
of the last five figures are identical, or figuring it another
way, when the claimed special damages of $1,638.50 and
$1,264.00 are added to $16,591.72, the total is exactly
$2,100.00 less than th·e total verdict. The affidavits of the
jurors received in p.roof of the quotient verdict showed
that as to the $2,100.00, $1,200.00 was for pain and suffering, and $900.00 wages paid hy plaintiff to his brother
for services on the farm June to D·ecember 2, 1947.
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After the jury was instructed, we took exception
(Tr. 545) to the court's instruction No. 17 (Tr. 74-5) as
a whole, and also to specific parts, including that part
'vhich told the jury that the plaintiff is entitled "to
compensation for his actual loss of p·ast ea)rnilngs, if any,
and for impairment of earning capacity, if any." When
we called attention to this error, counsel for plaintiff
turned down ~the offer of the court to call the jury back to
have the instruction corrected, and elected to take his
chances. The fact that the jury in its verdict allowed $900
for the past damages paid plaintiff's brother, plus $16,591.72, .or $100 per month for his full life exp.ectancy,
showed the harmful effect of this error and the misuse of
the annuity tables.
It should be noted that the reason or grounds for
admissibi~ty

of the annuity tables is quite different when
a death is involved and earning capacity is thereby ended or in an instance such as that which existed in Brwner
v. McC~arthy, et ·al, 105 Utah 399, 142 Pac. (2) '649, wherein a h·elper on the railroad, whose duties included putting
coal in the engines, sustained the loss of a leg, or in the
Pauley case (wherein the court expressed doubt as to
the sufficiency of th·e evidence governing their admissibility, where there was expert m~dical testimony that
there was fifty per cent disability of the leg for hard
work, twenty-five per cent disability in the left foot and
twenty-five per cent disability of the right hand and
another doctor testified that injured was not able to go
hack to work as a trainman for the· railroad.
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In Schlatter v. illcCarthy, et ial, (Utah) 196 Pac. (2)
968, this court aptly pointed out ~that the situation may
differ \Yhen various occup~ations are considered.
We submit that the use of the annuity tables should
not have been permitted in this case, because of the lack
of evidence of permatnernt impairment of earning capacity
of a substantial nature; that in any event the table used
was not in proper form; that the jury was not given
proper or adequate instructions; and that errors were
committed prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair
. and impartial trial on the measure of damages.

ASSIGNniENTS OF ERROR NOS. 7 TO 13
The usual issues of negligence and contributory
negligence were involved in this cas~e. Defendants
pleaded by their answer in substance that defendant's
driver was reasonably misled in that there was an apparent opportunity to pass, but plaintiff suddenly and
unexpectedly came from the west side of the road across
the center line and immediately in front of defendant's
truck, creating an emergency. That the collision was
solely caused or proximately contributed to by the negligence of plaintiff in the following particulars:
''(a) In approaching traffic coming from
the opposite direction on his wrong side of the
highway and in suddenly and unexpectedly creating an emergency by turning across the highway
immediately in front of such opposing traffic.
'' (b)

In failing to keep a reasonable and
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p~roper

lookout and particularly in failing to keep
a proper lookout for automobiles and traffic approaching from the opposite direction.
"'(c) In failing to keep said Chevrolet truck
under proper, immediate and safe control.
'' (d) In failing to exercise reasonable and
ordinary care to avoid a collision." Tr. 37-38).
1

ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO·. 7
The court erred in giving verbatim plaintiff's requested instruction No. 1 (Tr. 108). ·se-e the court's
instruction No. 6 (Tr. 63) as follows, to-wit:
''You are instructed that the defendants have
admitted in their answer and it is undisputed in
the evidence that the defendant Arrowhead
Freight Lines, Ltd., was the owner of the truck
and trailer which collided with plaintiff's truck
on April 3, 1947, that the defendant Marvin C.
Van Patten was the driver of said truck as the
servant, agent and employee of the defendant
Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., and was acting
within the course of his employment.
"You are further instructed that the defendant Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd., is l~able for
any negligent acts or omissions, if any, of its servant Marvin C. Van Patten, committed or omitted
by him in the course of his employment.''
Defendants duly excepted to the whole of said instruction and also specifically excepted to the last paragraph of said instruction, and further spe-cifically interposed an exception to the word ''liable.'' (Tr. 544).
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This instruction in unequivocal terms told the jury
that the defendant, . .\.rro\Yhead Freight Lines, Ltd., was
liable if there \Yas any possible negligence on the part of
the defendant, n1arvin C. 'Tan Patten.
It entirely eliminated proximate cause as a condition
to recovery.
It unequivocally eliminated contributory neg·ligence
as a defense so far as the defendant Arrowhead Freight
Lines, Ltd. was concerned.
Clear and palpable error of this kind is not cured by
other instructions correctly stating the law, because this
only creates a conflict in the instructions, and it is impossible to determine if a jury followed the correct instruction.
See Sorens1on v. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 Pac. 72, wherein the court stated:

'' * * * True, counsel point to other portions
of the charge wherein, they contend, the rule respecting the burden of proof is correctly stated. If
that be conceded, it still does not minimize, much
less cure, the palpable error contained in the foregoing instruction. At most it would merely present a case where two instructions were given
upon the same subject, one proper and the other
improper. Where such is the case, and the evidence is conflicting upon the subject covered by
the instructions, or is such that more than one
conclusion is permissible, and the record leaves
it in doubt whether the jury followed the instruction that is proper or the one that is improp,er,
then but one result is legally permissible in this
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court, and that is to reverse the judgment and
grant a new trial to the aggrieved party."
See. also Statte v. Green, (Utah) 6 Pac. (2d) 177;
Martin v. Sheffie~d, (Utah) 189 Pac. (2) 127, and the
cases hereinafter cited under the court's instruction No.

7.
ASSIGNMENT O·F ERROR NO·. 8
Defendants duly excepted to the court's instruction
No. 7 as a whole, as well as to certain parts of said instruction for the reasons hereinafter mentioned. (Tr.
544-5). The instruction given read:
"You are instructed that the laws of this
state provide that no vehicle shall be· driven to the
left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the
·same direction, unless such left side is clearly
visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking
and passing to· be completely n1ade without interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction of any
vehicle overtaken. In every event, the over-taking
vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the
roadway before coming within one hundred feet
of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction.
''If you shall find and believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants
operated the Arrowhead· truck and trailer upon
U. S. Highway 91, and attempted to overtake
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
at a time when ~the left side of said highway was
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not clearly visible and was not free from oncoming
traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit
such overtaking and passing to he completely
made without interfering with the safe operation
of the vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction, which was being driven by the plaintiff,
then you are instructed that such conduct on the
part of the defendants was neglig-ent and in violation of the traffic laws of this state; and if you
shall further find from a preponderance of the
evidence that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision between plaintiff's pickup
truck and said Arrowhead truck and trailer, then
you should find the issues in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants." (Tr. 64).
The instruction, the last one discussed, was as well as
erroneous and prejudicial error in that it directed the
jury to return a verdict ''in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants'' if they found the defendant
negligent, and ''that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision.''
Such instructions have repeatedly heen held to be
reversible error in that they eliminate contributory negligence as a defense. In other words, an instruction
requiring a verdict in favor of the plaintiff must state
all of the conditions essential to recov-ery or the instruction is erroneous. Nor is the error cured by reason of
the fact that the law is correctly stated in other instructions, because where there are conflicting instructions
it is impossible to say which instruction the jury followed in arriving at a verdict.
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The situation is well illustrated in Beyerle v. Clift,
(Cal.) (hearing denied by Supreme Court), 209 Pac. 1015.
We quote:
''The errors relied upon consist in the giving
of two instructions to the jury. In each of these
instructions the court stated certain provisions
of law defining the duties imposed upon an operator of a vehicle, and then said:
'' 'If, therefore, you believe that the defendant violated any of the provisions of the law above
mentioned at the time of the accident complained
of in this case, and that such violation was the
proximate cause of the accident, you should find
for the plaintiff.'
''Assuming that the issue of contributory
negligence was properly before the court, there
is no doubt that these w~ere erroneous instructions,
because it is settled law that, if an instruction by
its terms purports to state the conditions necessary to a verdict, it must state all those conditions
and must not overlook pleaded defenses on which
substantial ~evidence has been introduced.
''The court gave other instructions on the
subject of contributory negligence, the correctness of which is not challenged. But this is not
sufficient to overcome the prejudicial character
of the erroneous instructions.

'' ' * * * But the giving of these other instructions simply produce a clear conflict in the instructions given the jury by the court, and it is
impossible for us to say which instruction the jury
followed in arriving at a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.' Pie·rce v. Umited Gas & Elec. Co.,
sup;ra, 161 Cal. at page 185, 118 Pac. at page 704. ''
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In LaRu.e t\ Powell, (Cal.) (hearing denied by Supreme Court), ±2 Pac. (2) 1063, the court said and held:
'' ~The authorities ar~e legion to the effect
that a so-called ''formula'' instruction must contain all the elements essential to a recovery, and
the absence of any one of such elements may not
be compensated for nor cured by a reference
thereto in other instructions correctly and fully
stating the la\Y. * * *' We think is obvious that
the above instruction is fatally defective, and
although there are instructions inconsistent with
it we are satisfied they do not corr,ect the ·evil.
The instruction practically deprives the defendant
of a trial by jury under the negligence laws of
the state * * *''

'

In accord see also:
Sinin v. Atchesovn T. & S. F. Ry. C1o., 284 Pac.
1041;
Pierce v. United Gas & Electric Co., (Cal.) 118
Pac. 700;
Shell Pipe. Lime Co. v. Robims;on, (lOth C. C. A.)
66 Fed. (2) 861;
Bauer & JohnsiO'n Co. v.
(Neb.) 187 N. W. 59;

Nat~owal· R~oofimg

Co.,

Birmingham E. & B. R. C., v. Hoskims, (Ma.) 39
So. 338;
McVey v. St. Clair Co., (W.Va.) 38 S. E. 648;
Oklahoma R. Co. v. Milam, (Okla.) 147 Pac. 314;
J(r~)ena v. United R. R. Co. of S. F., (Cal.) 207 Pac.
35;
J.llorse v. Incorp,orated Town of C~astna, (Iowa)
241 N. W. 304;
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B.aker v. R~osaia, (Wash.) 5 Pac. (2) 1019;
PitJtsbu.rgh Cownty R. R. Co. v. H·asty, (Okla.) 233
Pac. 218;
Brooks vs. Tha;yer1 C1o., (Neb.) 254 N. W. 413.

The court's instruction No. 7, given at plaintiff's
request, was apparently taken from Section 57-7-124 of
the Utah Code. In addition to the reasons hereinabove
mentioned, the instruction was erroneous in that it told
the jury that defendant was negligent as a matter of ZOJUJ
if he was not successful in completely passing the Buick
car and also successful in getting completely back onto
his right side of the road before eoming within one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction (in this case, plain tiff's truck). The instruction
in that form failed to take into consideration the fact that
if Van Patten was misled by reason of the fact that
plaintiff's truck came from the west or wrong side of the
road in a deceptive dust storm or dust condition, that
there might be an excuse or justification on the part of
defendants' driver. In other words, if an emergency was
created or contributed to by reason of plaintiff's negligence, defendants should not be held negligent as a matter of law for not being able to successfully pass andreturn to his normal position on the highway. ·
In Larng v. Siddall, (Iowa) 254 N. W. 783, it was held
to he reversible error to instruct the jury that a failure
on the part of a person operating a motor vehicle upon a
public highway to give one-half of the traveled part of
such highway by turning to the right when meeting
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another vehicle '·constitutes negligence as a matter of
la,Y," 'vhen it is prima facie negligent. The court said:
~'The

instruction cannot be approved. It is
erroneous to instruct the jury that as a matter of
law it would constitute negligence. * * * The jury
should be told clearly, plainly and correctly the
rule of la'v pertaining to the so-called law of the
road under the circumstances, such as are presented in the case at bar, where it was contended
that the accident resulted because of the claim that
the appellant's automobile was on the wrong side
of the road. * * * The giving of the instruction
complained of was prejudicial error.''
The imposition of a greater duty upon the defendant
than the law requires was held rever.sible error in Sialtas
v. Affleck, (Utah) 105 Pac. (2) 17~6, wherein the court in
practical effect instructed the jury that the defendant
was required to drive his automobile "using reasonable
care and prudence so that he could avoid injuring anyone or colliding with any person upon the highway,''
whereas the law only requires one to use reasonable care
to avoid a collision. The court said such an instruction
practically required the defendant to avoid a collision
"with anyone regardless of whether such one were or
were not guilty of negligence.'' The court further pointed
out:
''That part of the instruction failed to take
into consideration the right of defendant to assume that all other persons upon the highway
would use ordinary care and reasonable precaution for their own safety until the contrary appeared.''
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It has been decided by California in connection with
a statute, which provided that before turning, the driver
''shall first see that such movement can be made in safety, and if it cannot he made in safety, shall wait until
it can be made in safety," that such statute required a
reasonable construction and that:
'' 'Safety' does not mean absolute safety, for
under that construction a driver intending to turn
would be required to await the time when no other
vehicle could possibly be affected in any way by
such movement. The quoted portion of the section
should be construed to require that the driver
see first that the movement could he made in safety, assuming that both he and others using the
highway exercise ordinary care. This gives to
the common sense rule embraced in the section
a common sense interpretation.'' Inouye v. Gilb~oy
,Co., (Cal.) 300 Pac. 835.
This, court in Martin v. Sheffield, supra, recently
pointed out that the court's instructions should clearly
set forth the correct "legal effect of defendant's negligence'' if any, -and in reversing the judgment pointed out
that in the instruction given in that case it:
''might well he construed by the jury to mean
that though the jury found negligence on the part
of plaintiff which proximately contributed to the
accident, nevertheless plaintiff was ·entitled to a
verdict.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49

DEFENDANTS' R.EQUE;S,TED INSTRUCTIONS
. \.SSIGNMENT
.
OF ERROR N:O. 11
The court, by its instruction No. 13, gave the preliminary part of defendants' requested instruction No. 6
(Tr. 90) as follo\vs:
"You are instructed that the laws of Utah
provide that upon all roadways of sufficient width
a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of
the roadway, except when overtaking and passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
under the Diles governing such movement.
"It ,,~as, therefore, the duty of the plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, to keep on his right side
of the highway at all times, particularly if there
was or might be traffic approaching from the
opposite direction.''
but there the instruction was ended, without stating the
legal effects or consequences of plaintiff's approaching
from the wrong side. The instruction should have been
completed as requested by defendants to further read
as follows:
''And if you find from the evidence that the
plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, was guilty of any
negligence in approaching on his wrong side of
the highway when there was traffic approaching
from the opposite direction, and that by reason
thereof, the defendant, Marvin C. Van Patten, was
prevented from seeing said pick-up truck driven
by plaintiff as soon as he could or would otherwise have seen it had it been upon its proper side
of the highway, or that the plaintiff, J. Harold
Mitchell, was thereby prevented from seeing the
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truck as soon as he could or would otherwise have
seen it, and that such negligence on the part of
plaintiff proximately contributed in any degree
to cause the collision, then plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict should be in favor of
defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause
of action, even if you should find there was also
negligence on the part of the defendant, Marvin
C. Van Patten." (Tr. 90-91)
Defendants were entitled to have the instruction
completed so as to explain the legal effects of plaintiff's
action as constituting contributory negligence, and what
verdict to return in the ·event they so found. Martin v.
She !field, supra.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO·. 12
The court refused to give defendants' requested instruction No. 9, as follows:
"You are instructed that it was the duty of
plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, to avoid creating an
emergency and also to avoid a collision if he could
do so in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary
care. Therefore, if you find from the eVidence
that the plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, was negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to
avoid an emergency or a collision by failing to
pull off and stop· on the left hand shoulder at an
earlier time or by negligently getting onto his
wrong side of the highway when there was traffic
approaching from the opposite direction, or by
failing to keep a prop~er lookout or by failing to
take reasonable and ordinary care to pass between
defendant's truck and the ca.r driven by Charles
S. PRce, and that such negligence on his part
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proxin1ately contributed in any degree to cause
the collision, then plaintiff cannot recover, and
your verdict should be in favor of defendants and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, even if
you should find there was also negligence on the
part of the defendant, ~I arvin C. Van Patt(~n.''
(Tr. 94)
The whole of this request was refused, the trial court
endorsing in pencil: ''Covered by No. 8 in substance.''
The court's instruction No.8 (Tr. 65) in no possible sense
of the \Yord covered the matter requested. While the
court's instruction No. 14 (Tr. 71) indirectly covers some
of the same subject matter, it did not adequately cover
the duty of plaintiff to take steps to avoid the collision,
by the means set forth in said request, and the legal effects of such as constituting contributory negligence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 13
The court refused defendants' requested instruction
No. 18 in its entirety as follows:
''You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence that the plaintiff,. J. Harold Mi tche11,
knowingly drove into a dust storm and continued
to drive therein at a time when he knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known,
that traffic was or might be approaching from
the opposite direction, and under such circumstances that, as a reasonable person under the
circumstances, he knew or should have known,
of the danger of collision with opposite-hound
traffic on said highway, due to limitrutions of visibility caused by the dust storm, then he was negligent, and if you further find that such negligence
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proximately contributed in any degree to cause
the collision, then plaintiff cannot recover and
your verdict should be in favor of defendants and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, even if
you should find there was also negligence on the
part of the defendant, Marvin C. Van Patten."
CTr. 103)
This requested instruction was justified because of
plaintiff's claim that he was entering a dust storm or
area, and that his visibility was substantially obscured
by reason of the sam·e. Entering a dust storm under such
conditions could reasonably be found by the jury to be
contributory negligence.
The court did in its instruction No. 10 explain plaintiff's duty to pull off onto the shoulder and stop if reasonably necessary (Tr. 67), but again the court in No. 10
did not go on to explain the legal ·effects of such failure
as constituting negligence or contributory negligence on
the part of plaintiff, to which defendants were entitled.
ASSIGNMENT OF· ERRO,R NO. 10
Defendants assigned as error the giving of the
court's instruction No. 10 for the reasons just mentioned,
and for the further reason that said instruction undertook to state that it was the duty of both drivers to drive
at a reasonable speed and to pull off to the side of the
highway and stop, if reasonably necessary to avoid danger ; however, the last paragraph of said instruction reads
as follows:
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·'Therefore, if you find from the evidence
that plaintiff or defendant \.,..an Patten 'vas unable
to see his true position on the highway and continued to drive at a speed 'vhich was not reasonable and prudent under the conditions then and
there existing, then the on.e violating this duty
u.:as negligent." (Tr. 67)
The court by using the underlined clause, inferredly or
impliedly told the jury that only one of the tvvo parties
could be negligent in such particulars.
The la\v is well established that defandants were
entitled to have the case submitted to the jury on any
theory justified by their evidence, as well as upon the
theory of the whole evidence, and failure to so instruct
the jury on a material issue under defendants' theory of
the evidence would affect defendants' substantial rights.

J1o.rgan v. Bingham Stage Lime Co., 75 Utah 87, 283
Pac. 160;
Hartley vs. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121,124 Pac. 522;
Pratt v. Utah Light & Tr. Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 Pac.
868;

Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 Pac. 893.

EVIDENCE AS TO PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE
There was substantial evidence of plaintiff's negligence in the particulars pleaded, and defendants were
entitled to adequate instructions as to those issues as
well as instructions correctly defining defendants' duties.
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Except for some variations as to actual distances, the
principal conflict in the evidence arose by reason of
plaintiff's testimony that he was at all times on his proper side of the highway and that he had pulled off onto the
east of the traveled or paved portion, being just in the
act of stopping. That plaintiff was in error was. proven
by the testimony of Van Patten corroborated by Charles
A. Pace, a disinterested witness.
MARVIN VAN PATTEN
Mr. Van Patten tes·tified that the van he was driving
was thirty feet in length, and. the trailer also thirty feet.
('Tr. 423). He said:
"Then I went on up over the ridge and as I
come to the top of the ridge I could see a· storm
on the flats. It was dusty and cloudy. I proceeded down off the Beaver Ridge and as I got down
onto the flats why I come upon a car that was
pulling a trailer. It was an open two-wheel
trailer. I followed him for quite some time; I
would say two or three miles, travelling pretty
slow. It was p-retty dusty and pretty windy
and then you would get a break it wouldn't be
quite so bad and you could see pretty good, and
I followed him down there.
''I had to get around him, and on one of these
breaks in the storm I could see down the road
far enough to pull up around him, and I proceeded to do that. I started up around and I got about
halfway along side this trailer when I noticed
a car coming up from the opposite side towards
this car I was passing, and just as I seen· him it
seemed like he crossed the center line, and when I
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seen him I couldn't get back behind the car I was
atten1pting to pass, so I pulled completely off the
road and at the same time he also pulled off the
road and "\Ye had our collision when "\Ve were completely off the road. (Tr. 424-5).

When you did that how far could you
see down the road~
'' Q.

"A. Well, I can't be sure on that. I would
say possibly 200 yards that I could see. I seen
I had plenty of room to pass or I don't believe
I would have attempted to pass in the first place.
The road was plenty clear when you got a break
in the storm. (Tr. 426).

"Q. Where did that truck come

from~

"A. It seemed like he coine from the center
of the road, or the opposite side, like he just
crossed over. (Tr. 426-7).

The truck was then possibly one hundred
yards away; "maybe not that far-I don't know
exactly-when I first seen him. * * * I believe I got
the whole truck and trailer completely off the
road before we had the collision.''
He turned about a forty-five degree angle toward the
southeast. The other car pulled off the road at the- same
time. Both trucks were going about the same speed.
(Tr. 427). He changed gears or shifted into third direct
when starting to pass. (Tr. 528)
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''We were completely off the road at the
time of the impact. * * *I don't know exactly how
far off it was. I know we were both completely off
the road. I would say anyway the distance of this
room, maybe ten or fifteen feet. ( Tr. 42).
"Q. What did you do, if anything, when you
saw this other car turning off the highway~

''A. I attempted to stop·, and also get out of
his way at the same time to avoid the collision,
if I could possibly do it. That is why I turned
off on the shoulder of the road, to avoid it.''
(Tr. 430).
He didn't believe the pick-up truck went over five or ten
feet after the impact. It wasn't very far. The left front
corner of plaintiff's truck came in contact with the right
front corner of defendants' truck. (Tr. 430-1).
On cross-examination, Van Patten further testified
that he was prepared to follow the Buick the rest of
the way if he had to, but the storm did break from time
to time. (T·r. 441). It was breaking more· as they went
along. (Tr. 444). In starting to pass, he went up to
about twenty miles an hour. Both trucks had their lights
on. When he got about even with the trailer, he continued
to look down the highway and could see two hundred
yards or better. (Tr. 445). He, Van Patten, didn't attempt to get hack into his proper lane because he was
too far up to do that and he didn't have time to complete
passing. (Tr. 447).
There was some confusion as to whether feet or
yards were meant in stating the distance between his
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truck and the )litchell truck 'vhen first seen, but he
finally approximated the distance at one hundred to
two hundred feet. ( Tr. 458). Prior to seeing the Mitchell
truck, he could see no vehicles approaching on the high'vay proper. (Tr. 459).

''I 'vas being very cautious and careful as
I knew how to be. I wouldn't have attempted to
pass in the first place if I hadn't seen ample room
to get around, and do it safely enough, I wouldn't

have attempted to pass in the first place." ('Tr.
460).
The borrow pit was not very deep. It was more or less
level. When he came in contact with the Mitchell truck,
it swung the Mitchell truck around. ('Tr. 460). There
were no marks indicating the Mitchell truck had been
"shoved or pushed forward." It (the sand or dirt)
was disturbed around there where he had turned after
the impact. ('Tr. 461).

'' Q. And yet you didn't see the Mitchell
car until it came within 100 feet~
''A.

That is right.

'' Q. Why, on account of the dust~
"A.
road.

Well, it was on the opposite side of the

''Q. I thought you said it was in the center
of the road~
''A. Yes. I wasn't looking for one there.
I was looking more or less on the east side. * * *
I wasn't looking for any on that (opposite) side.''
(Tr. 462).
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It just came out of nowhere. (Tr. 463).
"Q. You mentioned, Mr. Van Patten, that
you did not expect Mr. Mitchell to come from the
west side of the road; is that correct~
"A.

That is correct." ( Tr. .W6).
CHARL.ES .A. PACE

Charles A. Pace, a disinterested witness, testified
that he was on his way to Lake Mead; that he was traveling in the west lane of traffic ( Tr. 470), about in the
middle of that lane, at about ten or fifteen miles an hour,
going just about as slow as he could go and still keep
going. He had been traveling at that speed for quite
some distance. With reference to plaintiff's pick-up
truck, he said :
''Well, it just seemed to come up out of nowhere. Visibility was bad and it just came up all
of a sudden. It came from the opposite direction.
I could only give the approximate distance that
I first saw it. I would say anywhere from 25 to
50 yards approximately. (Tr. 471)
Where was that truck with respect to
the center of the highway.
''A. It was about in the center of the highway, or probably straddled on the center, or
yellow, line of the highway when I saw it.
'' Q.

'' Q.

Had you seen that pick-up truck prior

to that time~
''A. No sir. I didn't actually see the collision.; they hit just back of me. I heard the crash
but I did not actually see them hit.''
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He went back to the scene of the accident. With reference
to the t\YO trucks, he said:
''They were both off the highway, down into
the barrow pit. (Tr. 472).

''Q. Did you observe the conduct of Mr. Van
Patten after the accident¥
"A. y es, s1r.
.
'' Q.

In what manner did he conduct himself¥

''A. \'ery gentlemanly, very fine and very
gentlemanly.''
On cross-examination, he said he would judge that

he had traveled more than a mile through the dust storm.
'' ~Iy guess would be several miles.'' ( Tr. 478). The dust
storm did not envelop-e the highway constantly.
· ''There would be breaks that you could see
through, and see the pavement ahead; then it
would fill in and you could not see the pavement
nowhere. * * * and sometimes it would clear away
and you could see the highway for some distance
ahead." (Tr. 474).
When the dust abated, there were sort of gusts of wind
and dust. He could not estimate the 'exact distance of
visibility. (Tr. 475).
''It would vary, sometimes it would be a short
time, sometimes longer." (Tr. 476).
The pictures identified as plaintiff's Exhibits V
and P, and the diagram, defendants' Exhibit 6, hereinabove shown in the brief, show that the collision took
place well east of the paved highway, when viewed in
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connection vvith the foregoing summary of \l an Patten's
and Pace's testimony.

J. HAROLD MITCHELL
That Van Patten was in fact coming to the end of
the dust storm and into the clearing is also evident from
p~laintiff's testimony:
'' Q. And then you later noticed that the
dust did clear up to some extent, did you not~

''A. That's right; it wasn't, it wasn't entirely regular. ·There were waves, sometimes the dust
was a little heavier that ·at other times.
'' Q. In other words, the dust was variable;
sometimes it was thicker than others~

''A.

That's right.

'' Q. And about the time you - after you
waited for this other car to get ahead, and the
dust had started to clear, as you thought it had
started to clear, then you started out, didn't you~

"A. Yes.

"Q. The dust didn't prevent you from seeing the line~
"A. No." (Tr. 336·-7).
WILLIAM M. MITCHELL
William M. Mitchell, plaintiff's father, was riding
with him and app·eared to be concerned as to whether
they were on the proper side of the road, as is. shown
from the following part of his testimony:
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"Q. About ho'v far ahead of the pick-up
truck could you see as you proceeded through the
dust1
''A. Well, I wasn't looking ahead very far.
I kept my eye on the shoulder of the road to see
\Ye were in the road as we went along.
'' Q.

\ 1lhy were you doing that 1

'' ~-\.. Because I was little nervous, quite
dusty, and I la1ew my son \Vas careful driver,
but, just the same, I ,,~as just little worried for
fear we would get one side or the other off the
road." (Tr. 398).
When it reasonably appeared to Van Patten that
he was coming into the clearing and from his position
that he had a reasonable opportunity to pass, it cannot
be said that he was negligewt as :a mat'ter ~of law in pulling
up into position beside the trailer. At that point, he was
confronted with an unexpected or sudden emergency
by reason of the fact that Mitchell ap·parently through
his own misjudgment, or being lost in the fog, had gotten
west of the highway and cut across immediately in front
of the Pace Buick and defendants' truck. Van Patten
then did all he could to stop aatd get out of the way by; ,
turning abruptly into the borrow pit. Had Mitchell been
where he woud normally be expected to be, on the east
side of the road, Van Patten, although behind the Buick
and trailer, probably would have seen him before he did,
and would not have undertaken to pass had he known
~fitchell was approaching. At least, he may not have
reached such a position that he could not return to his
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proper side. Van Patten savvrthe Mitchell truck "\vhen one
hundred to three ·hundred feet away, and the physical
facts necessarily bear him out. Therefore, it likewise
must have been possible for Mitchell to see the same distance, but he acknowledged not seeing defendants' truck
until twenty-five feet away. (Tr. 238) Had Mitchell seen
defendants' truck earlier, he might reasonably have
avoided the collision. Neither truck was exceeding fifteen
or twenty miles per hour, and there "\vas twelve, or possibly tvventy feet, between the center line of the highway
and where the collision occurr.ed. Had Mitchell seen defendant's truck earlier, or had he been more alert, he reasonably could have turned slightly to the west before the
collision or stopped sooner. In view of the conflict as
to whether Mitchell created an emergency, and in view
of the possible inferences and deductions from the evidence, it was reversible error for the court to instruct
the jury as it did and refuse to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant.

MO·TlON FOR NE·W TRIAL.
Defendants duly moved for a new trial on the
grounds that the verdict was excessive and upon errors
in law occuring at the trial, as hereinabove outlined, and
· misconduct of the jury in arriving at a quotient verdict.
('Tr. 118). In support of the latter ground, affidavits
of seven jurors were filed on behalf of defendants. We
quote the affidavit of Sterling E. ·Tanner, foreman, to
which six of the other jurors agreed:
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'~Sterling

E. Tanner, being first duly sworn
on oath, deposes and says: That he is one of the
jurors and foreman, on the trial of the above entitled case, wherein a verdict was returned Monday, April 26, 1948. That the amount of the verdict was determined in the following manner:
''We first agreed to return a verdict for the
plaintiff. We then allowed the special damages of
$1638.50 on the first cause of action, and $1264.00
on the second cause of action. We then added
$16,591.72 from the annuity table, plus $900.00 for
wages paid to plaintiff's brother during 1947. We
differed as to the amount to be paid for pain and
suffering, so we each agreed to submit an amount
on a slip of paper as to the amount, if any, that
should be awarded. We also agreed to adopt the
average as our verdict, after including the
amounts hereinabove mentioned. We each submitted a figure by secret ballot, and they were
then handed to me and I added the figures and
divided by eight, which gave a result of $1,200.00,
which figure governed our final verdict without
further deliberation. Adding of all the figures
was checked by some of the jurors, but there was
no further deliberation after we computed the
average of $1,200.00, as to pain and suffering. On
my slip, I put nothing for pain and suffering,
but consented to the result because of our previous
agreement." (Tr. 121-133).
These affidavits, in clear, concise and unmistakable
language, showed that the final figure of $1200.00, as to
pain and suffering was arrived at by quotient verdict.
As that was the final figure which w·ent to make the final
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by confessed that their final verdict was arrived at by
quotient or chance.
While counsel for respondent went back and obtained counter-affidavits (Tr. 134-149), couched in his own
language or legal phraseology apparently obtained from
the case of Pence v. Mining C~o:., 27 Utah 378, 75 Pac.
934, the jurors having confessed in clear and concise
terms under oath to the quotient verdict,, their later
modification was clearly an afterthought to avoid the
effects of such illegal or quotient verdict.
The trial court should have granted a new trial
on account of the numerous grounds herein argued, or
in any event reduced the verdict to $5,002.50 by eliminating the figure $16,591.72 on 'the grounds that the verdict
vvas excessive.

CONCL U·SION
The fact that the verdict in this case, exclusive of
the figure of $16,591.72, adopted from the annuity tables,
was $5,002.50 (that is $1,638.50 special damages for medical, hospital, traveling expenses, and incidental property
damage; $1,264.00, damages to the truck; $900.00, wages
paid plaintiff's brother; and $1,200.00, for pain and suffering) illustrates their vicious effect upon defendants'
right to a fair and impartial trial on the issue of damages.
This is particularly true when the evidence is totally
insufficient to sustain the admissibility of the tables,
as it was in this case. It is equally important that even
when admissible, that they be in p~roper form and not in
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such form as to be eonfusing or misleading. Proper
precaution should al\Yays be taken so.that adequate qualifying and explanatory instructions are given to the jury,
explaining the limitations upon their use as applied to
the actual evidence in the case so that the jurors can apply them properly and upon a correct theory in relation to permanent impairment of earning capacity, and
not in relation to. special damage such as wages, which
they appeared to do in this case. We submit that the
tables should have been excluded altogether, but even
if admissible, that reversible error was committeed as to
their use.
As to the instructions on the issues of n-egligence
and contributory negligence, defendant was likewise entitled to have the jury prop·erly instructed and to a fair
trial upon those issues.
It also appears from the evidence that the verdict
is excessive and unreasonable, aside from the errors
above discussed.
We
granted.

resp~ectfully

submit that a new trial should be

Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNO·N & HANSOjN
E. F. BALD·WIN, JR.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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